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Bayesian probability theory is used to analyze the oft-made assumption that humans are typical
observers in the universe. Some theoretical calculations make the selection fallacy that we are
randomly chosen from a class of objects by some physical process, despite the absence of any
evidence for such a process, or any observational evidence favoring our typicality. It is possible to
favor theories in which we are typical by appropriately choosing their prior probabilities, but such
assumptions should be made explicit to avoid confusion.
An increasingly common kind of reasoning in funda-
mental cosmology starts from an assumption that some
property of human observers is typical in some class C of
objects in the universe. This assumption is then used in
conjunction with a physical theory of cosmology to draw
conclusions about the properties of the universe that we
should expect to observe. However, it is perfectly possi-
ble (and not necessarily unlikely) for us to live in a uni-
verse in which we are not typical. Indeed, there are many
choices of the class C (such as all compact objects with
mass between 10 and 100 kg) for which we have data that
definitively establishes that humans are not typical. Any
assumption of typicality or mediocrity should therefore
be carefully scrutinized.
Such an examination seems especially timely because
of recent discussions drawing conclusions from the pos-
sible existence (in a very large universe) of vacuum fluc-
tuated brains (also known as “Boltzmann brains” or
“freak observers”). Astounding conclusions have been
drawn using arguments that involve these possibilities,
notably those of Page [1, 2, 3, 4] that the universe must
be limited in time and space in order to avoid having
too many fluctuated brains that would make human ob-
servers untypical in any class that includes these fluctu-
ated brains. Some other recent discussions of this issue
include [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Early discussions of the role of typi-
cality in inflationary cosmology include [10, 11]. Previous
criticism of typicality assumptions includes [12, 13].
Typicality assumptions involving human observers in
a class containing other kinds of observers can be based
on different types of information. These include (1) em-
pirical extrapolations of data concerning extraterrestrial
observers, (2) plausible guesses for the predictions of a
more fundamental theory, and (3) mere personal prefer-
ence for theories in which we are typical of something.
Since we currently have no data on extraterrestrial ob-
servers, there are no examples of type (1). An exam-
ple of type (2) is the oft-made assumption in multiverse
cosmology that the number of ordinary observers is pro-
portional to the number of galaxies, or to the number
of baryons, or to some other similar proxy. This paper
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does not criticize such assumptions when they are clearly
stated. However, it will be argued that assumptions of
type (3) are not well justified, and can lead to ridiculous
conclusions that will be illustrated with simple examples.
To indicate where the paper is headed some of its con-
clusions are summarized below.
• A theory is not incorrect merely because it predicts
that we are atypical.
• Theories are tested using our data as a collectivity
of human observers. What other observers might
see, how many of them there are, and what proper-
ties they do or do not share with us are irrelevant
for this process.
• No part of our data should be neglected in the
process of discriminating between competing theo-
ries unless it can be demonstrated that the relevant
probabilities are insensitive to it.
• Two theories that predict our data with equal prob-
ability are indistinguishable on the basis of that
data. Cosmological models that predict that at
least one instance of our data exists (with prob-
ability one) somewhere in spacetime are indistin-
guishable no matter how many other exact copies
of these data exist.
• We have data that we exist in the universe, but
we have no evidence that we have been selected by
some random process. We should not calculate as
though we were.
• In a fundamental theory of quantum cosmology,
there is no need for any assumption of typicality
to predict what we might see. However typicality,
and the measures to implement it, may be implied
by the fundamental theory. In absence of a man-
ageable candidate for such a theory, it can be useful
to try to guess such measures.
Bayesian probability theory is the basis for this anal-
ysis. In addition to supporting the conclusions above, it
will be used discuss some classes of mistakes that can be
made in applying the Bayesian procedure. These include
neglecting relevent parts of our data, and making the se-
lection fallacy that we are randomly selected from some
class C.
2I. TESTING THEORIES USING BAYESIAN
PROBABILITIES
This section briefly reviews the elements of the
Bayesian framework for testing theories. (For a compact
introduction, see [14]; for complete details, see [15]; for
an elegant presentation of the necessity of the Bayesian
point of view, see [16].) Suppose we have a set of theories
that we wish to discriminate between. For simplicity, as-
sume the theories form a finite discrete set {T1, . . . , TN},
with any continuous parameters binned. The specifica-
tion of a theory is taken to include both the dynamics
and the initial conditions, so that the theory contains
enough information to make calculable predictions. For
simplicity, we assume that the set of theories is complete,
so that one of them must be true; if this is not the case,
the probabilities to be calculated are relative rather than
absolute.
Bayesian analysis has three inputs: First is a prior
probability or prior P (Ti) for each theory. These priors
should be assigned before any data is obtained. Although
the priors can in principle be chosen arbitrarily, standard
practice is to try to make a choice that suitably reflects
our ignorance; for example, by assigning equal probabil-
ities to the discrete set of theories. In the terminology of
Bayesian theory, the choice should be “noninformative”.
The exact choice of priors is ultimately unimportant in
situations where there can be an arbitrarily large num-
ber of identical trials. However, in areas like cosmology,
where data is hard to come by, priors can strongly influ-
ence the final conclusions.
Second there is the specification of the data D with
which we seek to discriminate between the theories. This
is the data of the collectivity of human observers doing
the Bayesian analysis.
The third input is the likelihood P (D|Ti) that (upon
suitable observation) we will obtain a particular data set
D, given that the theory is Ti. An important point is
that, for each theory, the likelihood should be calculable.
If we can only estimate but not calculate a likelihood,
then we should enlarge our set of theories by introducing
new parameters that account for our ignorance of the
likelihood, and allow these parameters to vary over the
new, larger, set of theories.
Finally, there is the output — what we really want to
know — the posterior probability P (Ti|D), the probabil-
ity of theory Ti, given the data D that we have obtained.
The posterior probabilities for the various theories are
related to the prior probabilities and the likelihoods by
Bayes’ theorem,
P (Ti|D) =
P (D|Ti)P (Ti)∑
i
P (D|Ti)P (Ti)
. (1.1)
This is the key formula of Bayesian analysis.
II. PRIORS FAVORING TYPICALITY
Our typicality can be enforced simply by choosing pri-
ors that favor theories that imply that we are typical. A
specific example is useful to illustrate the dangers inher-
ent in this kind of reasoning (type 3 above).
Consider two theories of the development of planet-
based intelligent life, based on the appropriate physics,
chemistry, biology, and ecology. Theory A predicts that
there are likely to be intelligent beings living in the at-
mosphere of Jupiter; theory B predicts that there are
no such beings. Because Jupiter is much larger than the
Earth, theory A predicts that there are today many more
jovians than humans.
Would we reject theory A solely because humans would
not then be typical of intelligent beings in our solar sys-
tem? Would we use this theory to predict that there
are no jovians, because that is the only way we could be
typical? Such a conclusion seems absurd.
We could nevertheless enforce an assumption of typi-
cality by assigning a low prior probability to theory A,
and a high prior probability to theory B. Alternatively,
we could choose priors that favor theory B, so that the
Earth is more typical of the planets in the solar system1.
However, any a priori favoring of either theory is con-
trary to the standard scientific practice of assigning non-
informative priors that do not preselect conclusions be-
fore relevant data is obtained.
III. DATA
A discussion of what is meant by ‘our data’ necessarily
begins with a discussion of what is meant by ‘we’, ‘us’,
and ‘our’. In this paper, ‘we’ refers to the information
gathering and utilizing system (IGUS) that is engaged
in the process of gathering data, constructing alternative
theories, and using Bayesian analysis to discriminate be-
1 This was the point of view taken by Huygens [17] in 1698: “A
Man that is of Copernicus’s Opinion, that this Earth of ours
is a Planet, carry’d round and enlighten’d by the Sun, like the
rest of them, cannot but sometimes have a fancy, that it is not
improbable that the rest of the planets must have their Dress and
Furniture, nay and their inhabitants too as well as this Earth of
ours.” Further he argues from the similarities among species from
distant parts of the Earth (such as Europe and America) that we
should be typical of the inhabitants of other planets: “’Tis more
probable that all the difference there is between us and them,
springs from the greater or less distance and influence from that
Fountain of Heat and Life the Sun; which will cause a difference
not so much in their Form and Shape, as in their Matter and
Contexture.” He then concludes that there must be substances
on the other planets serving the role of water on this one: “I can’t
say that they are exactly of the same nature with our Water, but
that they should be liquid their use requires, as their beauty does
that they should be clear.” In this case, Huygens’ assumption of
the typicality of the Earth obviously did not lead him to correct
conclusions.
3tween these theories. In this epoch, that is naturally the
human scientific IGUS on Earth (HSI). If we ever have
scientific exchanges with IGUSes elsewhere, the defini-
tion would have to be enlarged.
‘Our data’ D includes every scrap of information that
the HSI possesses about the physical universe: every
record of every experiment, every astronomical observa-
tion of distant galaxies, every available description of ev-
ery leaf, etc., and necessarily every piece of information
about the HSI itself, its members, and its history. The
choices of coarse graining used to define this information,
the level of accessibility demanded, etc., are inevitably
subjective but assumed here to be fixed. The data must
all be expressed in physical terms in the language of the
theories being tested so that the likelihoods P (D|Ti) can
be computed.
All the information possessed by the HSI should be
included in D unless it can be demonstrated that the
posterior probabilities P (Ti|D) are insensitive to it. Of
course, we can practically test theories only if we can as-
sume that this is the case for most of our data. The im-
portant point is that any such assumption can be checked
by experiment or calculation. To arbitrarily neglect some
pieces of data in favor of others is unscientific and risks
contradiction when the neglected data is later considered.
What are the implications of this for typicality? It
is our data that is used in a Bayesian analysis to dis-
criminate between theories. What other hypothetical
observers with data different from ours might see, how
many of them there are, and what properties they might
or might not share with us (defining some notion of typ-
icality) are irrelevant for this process. In particular the
number of vacuum fluctuated brains with different data
(for example with disordered observations as discussed
by Page [1, 2]) is irrelevant. As far as Bayes’ theorem is
concerned, the only other observers that matter are ones
that have exactly the same data D.
Observers with identical data may occur in multiple
places in a large universe. For example, in contemporary
inflationary models, we may know that we are 14Gyr
from the nucleation of our pocket universe. But we know
neither the location of that pocket universe in spacetime
or how many others like it with identical data may have
been nucleated elsewhere. Vacuum or thermal fluctua-
tions that produce identical data must also be considered.
These unknown locations and origins must be summed
over in calculating the likelihoods P (D|T ). All we know
is that there exists at least one such region containing our
data. This idea is illustrated with simple models in the
following sections.
Beyond testing theories, questions sometimes arise like
“What would be the probability to observe a cosmic mi-
crowave background (CMB) at a temperature of 3K if
we didn’t already know the value of this temperature?”
In such cases the data D (which includes the observa-
tion of a 3K CMB) must be divided into a part that
could have varied and a notion of ‘us’ that could not.
There is additional ambiguity, and additional subjective
choice, in making this division. At one extreme, the 3K
could be included in the meaning of ‘us’ (no division),
in which case ‘we’ could never have observed anything
else, by definition. At the other extreme, ‘us’ could be
defined to be an object less than 200 kg, in which case
we could be talking about the CMB temperature a rock
might have received. Most physicists would make less ex-
treme choices, but it is important to recognize that the
answers to such questions depend on the choice.
IV. LIKELIHOODS AND THE SELECTION
FALACY
Return for the moment to the human/jovian model
and assume that each theory is able to predict a proba-
bility for the number of humans H and jovians J alive
today. The question then becomes, what is the data?
We know that the actual number of humans today is
H∗ = 6.57× 109. (For simplicity, assume that this num-
ber is known exactly.) We know nothing at all about
the actual number of jovians today; this data has not
yet been obtained. Thus, the likelihood that a theory Ti
predicts the data D that we actually have in this case is
given by summing over the mutually exclusive probabili-
ties for different numbers of jovians, with the number of
humans fixed to its known value,
P (D|Ti) =
∞∑
J=0
P (H∗, J |Ti). (4.1)
The likelihood for the data is independent of the number
of jovians predicted by the theory, simply because we
have not observed the number of jovians.
It is important to note that there is an alternative,
incorrect computation of the likelihood that favors typi-
cality. The invalid reasoning goes as follows. “I observe
that I am human. I might, however, have been jovian. If
there are H humans and J jovians, the probability that
I observe myself to be human is H/(H + J). Therefore,
I should multiply the probability P (H, J |Ti) that there
are H humans and J jovians by a factor of H/(H+J) to
account for the probability that I have observed myself to
be human and not jovian. Then I compute the likelihood
as
P (D|Ti) =
∞∑
J=0
H∗
H∗ + J
P (H∗, J |Ti), (4.2)
instead of (4.1). The factor of H∗/(H∗ + J) in (4.2)
results in likelihoods that (when used in Bayes’ theorem)
disfavor theories that predict H ≪ J , and hence lead to
the conclusion that humans should be typical. This is
the kind of argument made in [5, 6], and would seem to
be a natural interpetation of [1, 2, 3, 4]2.
2 However, in private discussions, Page says the typicality factors
4The factor of H∗/(H∗ + J) would be correct if we (or
some outside agency) had performed an experiment that
had (somehow) selected a single intelligent being in the
solar system, with equal a priori probability for each,
and that we or the outside agency knew the result of this
selection. However, noticing that we are human is not
equivalent to performing such an experiment. For ex-
ample, it would certainly be incorrect to conclude that,
since each of the two authors of this paper is human, the
correct factor to multiply by is (H∗/(H∗ + J))2. This is
because the probability that one of us is human is obvi-
ously not independent of the status of the other. Thus,
whatever selection is performed when one of us notices
that he is human, it is surely not equivalent to a ran-
dom selection of a single intelligent being anywhere in
the solar system.
In fact, there has been no selection at all. Intelligent
beings on Earth notice that they exist, call themselves
“humans”, and count up how many there are. What-
ever may or may not be happening on Jupiter is entirely
irrelevant. This leads immediately to eq. (4.1) for the
likelihood, which does not favor or disfavor typicality of
humans. If we now set all priors equal, P (Ti) = 1/N
with N the number of theories, we immediately find
P (Ti|D) ∝ P (D|Ti). That is, the probability that a the-
ory is correct is directly proportional to the probability
that it predicts the correct number of humans, indepen-
dent of the number of jovians.
To compute likelihoods as though we had been ran-
domly selected by some physical process, when there is
no evidence for such a process, commits what might be
called the selection fallacy. We are not a disembodied
entity that was randomly selected to have a particular
physical description; instead, we are the meaning of a
transcription of ‘we’ into the language of physical theory.
As shown above, the correctly computed likelihood
does not favor typicality of humans. However, we can, if
we wish, implement an assumption of typicality through
the choice of priors. We do this by identifying the set of
theories that predicts that P (H, J |Ti) is small whenever
H is much less than J . Then we assign these theories
small values of P (Ti). For example, we could choose
P (Ti) ∝ H¯i/(H¯i+ J¯i) (or some power of that), where H¯i
and J¯i are the mean number of humans and jovians that
are predicted by theory Ti.
As was mentioned earlier, there is nothing wrong in
principle with any choice of priors. However, choos-
ing priors that favor one or another prediction (that we
happen to like) goes against standard scientific practice,
and simply represents an unsupported (by data) personal
preference for a certain result.
arise naturally in his theory of quantum mechanics [18], in which
the basic quantities are operators representing the conscious per-
ceptions of observers. These ideas are not discussed here.
V. A SIMPLE COSMOLOGICAL MODEL
A simple (highly idealized) cosmological model will fur-
ther illustrate the key issues.
Consider a model universe which has N cycles in time,
k = 1, . . . , N . In each cycle the universe may have one of
two global properties: red (R) or blue (B), which could
be thought of as (for example) two different possible val-
ues of the CMB temperature. To further simplify the dis-
cussion, the only relevant observables are assumed to be
(1) the value of the property and (2) the existence of an
observing system that is able to determine this value. In
each cycle, the probability for such an observing system
to exist is taken to be pE ; this probability is assumed to
be independent of whether the universe is red or blue in
that cycle. Furthermore, observations are assumed to be
perfectly accurate, so that if red is observed in any cycle,
then the universe is red in that cycle, and conversely.
Two competing theories of this model universe are pro-
posed. One, all red or AR, in which all the cycles are red,
and another, some red or SR, in which some number of
particular cycles are red and the rest are blue. We (an
idealized observing system) seek to discriminate between
these two theories on the basis of our data.
Suppose that we (a particular observing system) ob-
serve red. Our data D is then (E,R), which in the con-
text of the model could be more fully described as ‘there
is at least one cycle in which an observing system exists
and the universe is red’. Using this data we carry out a
Bayesian analysis to discriminate between the two theo-
ries assuming equal priors for simplicity. The probability
that there is at least one cycle with (E,R) is the same as
one minus the probability of the negation of this, which
is the probability that no observing system exists in a
cycle in which the universe is red. Since the probability
for an observing system not to exist in any one cycle is
1− pE , the likelihoods are
P (E,R|T ) = 1− (1 − pE)
NR(T ), (5.1)
where NR(T ) is the number of red cycles in theory T ,
equaling N when T is AR. Assuming equal priors, (1.1)
yields the posterior probabilities
P (T |E,R) =
P (E,R|T )
P (E,R|AR) + P (E,R|SR)
, (5.2)
where T is either AR or SR.
A number of limiting cases of the likelihoods (5.1) and
their consequent posterior probabilities (5.2) are of inter-
est.
If pE is close to one, then P (E,R|T ) ≈ 1 for both the-
ories. That is not very surprising, since the probability
is high for there to be an observing system in every cy-
cle. The probability that there is at least one red cycle
with an observing system is therefore also high in both
theories. Thus our data do not discriminate between the
two theories, and indeed p(T |E,R) ≈ 1/2 for both.
Another case is where our data does not discriminate
between the two theories occurs when pE < 1, and NR is
5large in both theories to make (1−pE)
NR(T ) ≪ 1, so that
P (E,R|T ) ≈ 1 for both theories. Even though there
may be more many more red cycles in the AR theory
than the SR theory, the probability that there is at least
one red cycle with an observing subsystem approaches
one for both theories when NR becomes large in both. In
this case, our data is not enough to discriminate between
the two theories. This is important because inflationary
theories can be expected to imply large numbers of any
conceivable situation.
If pE ≪ 1/N , then P (E,R|T ) ≈ NR(T )pE, and the
resulting posterior probabilities are
P (AR|E,R) =
1
1 + fR
, P (SR|E,R) =
fR
1 + fR
, (5.3)
where fR ≡ NR(SR)/N is the fraction of red cycles in
the SR theory. In this case, if fR is small, the AR theory
is strongly favored.
In the small pE limit, the result (5.3) is the same as
it would be if it was assumed that we were the unique
observing system existing in the universe, but that we
did not know the cycle k in which we were located. More
specifically, were we unique, the probability that we were
in cycle k observing R would be 1/N if cycle k is red in
theory T , and zero if it is blue. Summing these probabil-
ities over k yields (5.3).
Confusingly, this result is also the same under the as-
sumption that our location is randomly selected from the
N possible cycles. This notion presupposes that we exist
separately from our physical description. But we are not
separate from our physical description in our data; we are
the physical system described, and no random selection
has been made. In contemporary inflationary models, we
are very unlikely to be unique as physical systems within
the infinite multiverse. In this case, reasoning as if we
had been randomly selected will not give correct results,
as the above example shows.
The implications of this simple model for typicality
can now be discussed. To emphasize that other observers
with data different from ours are irrelevant for predict-
ing what we observe, the likelihoods (5.1) can be calcu-
lated in a different way. First consider the probability
P (nR, nB|T ) that there are nR observing systems in red
cycles and nB orbserving systems in blue cycles,
P (nR, nB|T ) =
(
NR(T )
nR
)(
NB(T )
nB
)
× pnR+nB
E
(1− pE)
N−nR−nB , (5.4)
where NB(T ) and NR(T ) are the number of blue and red
cycles in each theory. Our data is ‘there is at least one
red cycle containing an observing system’. This is related
to (5.4) by
P (E,R|T ) =
NR(T )∑
nR=1
NB(T )∑
nB=0
P (nR, nB|T ), (5.5)
which, as is easily shown, yields (5.1). The elementary
but important point is that the number of oberving sys-
tems measuring blue must be summed over. The value
of that number therefore does not affect the probability
for our data.
If the number of red cycles is infinite in both models,
then the two theories are not distinguished by our data
even if the number of fraction of red cycles is small in
SR. That is because our data is that there is at least
one red cycle. As the number of red cycles approaches
infinity, that becomes a certainty in both theories. Even
though the typical observing system in the SR theory is
observing blue, our data provides no evidence that we
are typical.
In such cases it is tempting to reason as follows: In the
SR theory with mostly blue cycles we are more likely to
observe blue than red. Since we observe red we should
reject this theory. This is the kind of argument made
by [5] against eternal deSitter space. This, however, is
an instance of the selection fallacy, and in more famil-
iar situations leads to absurd conclusions such as those
discussed earlier.
VI. DERIVING MEASURES
After a sufficient time, an isolated quantum system
with (sufficiently complex interactions) will come to equi-
librium, and the predictions for the probabilities of cer-
tain variables like total energy, momentum and number
will be given by an equilibrium density matrix. In princi-
ple the there is no need for an equilibrium density matrix.
Were the initial state known and powers of computation
unlimited, the state could be evolved forward by the ap-
propriate time and the probabilities calculated directly.
However, the power, utility, and perhaps even the neces-
sity of a notion of equilibrium and the density matrix
that defines it are well known. The important point is
that such a density matrix cannot be posited arbitrarily;
it follows from the dynamics in principle, and its form
can be checked (see, e.g., [19]).
Similarly, in a complete quantum theory of the uni-
verse, there is in principle no need for any further as-
sumption about typicality of human observers, or a mea-
sure implementing that notion of typicality. The proba-
bilities for our observations would follow from a theory of
the dynamics, the initial quantum state, and an accurate
quantum description of human beings, their knowledge,
and their data [20].
However, we presently lack even one example of such a
complete theory, and in practice calculations of the his-
tory and observations of human observers are well beyond
current and foreseeable abilities to compute. It then be-
comes useful to make plausible hypotheses of what such a
complete theory might predict, and (as mentioned above)
to expand the family of theories being tested to include
these hypotheses. For example, inflationary cosmology
frequently assumes a classical spacetime that models dis-
6tributions of bubbles nucleated in quantum events. Our
location in this spacetime is unknown. To calculate the
probabilities of what we might see, it becomes convenient
to posit a distribution of positions in space and time to-
gether with a measure to define it. This distribution can
in principle be checked in a complete theory of quantum
cosmology. It might even be possible to infer a distribu-
tion for where other observers are located in the universe
and a measure to define that.
In a Bayesian analysis of such situations, priors must
be assigned to candidates for a complete theory, and also
to different hypotheses of what it will predict. In the
example of inflationary cosmology, priors would be as-
signed to different measures and typicality assumptions.
In Bayesian terms, debates about which measure is cor-
rect are discussions of these priors. The important thing
is that these priors can be improved through the usual
process of Bayesian updating after acquiring more data
or by firming up predictions by better calculation. That
is in contrast to priors which merely express personal
preference for theories in which we are typical.
VII. CONCLUSION
The course of physics, both theoretically and experi-
mentally, is guided by prejudice as to the nature of the
theory sought for. We favor theories that are simple,
beautiful, precisely formulable mathematically, econom-
ical in their assumptions, comprehensive, unifying, ex-
planatory, accessible to existing intuition, etc. etc. Most
importantly we favor theories that are successful in pre-
dicting new data beyond what we have at the moment.
The bases for such prejudices do not lie in logic but rather
previous experience with constructing successful theories.
Especially in areas far from immediate experiment, it
is important to distinguish facts, logical deduction, and
prejudices. Bayesian analysis provides a framework for
doing this. Data are the domain of facts, likelihoods are
the domain of logical deduction, and the priors are the
domain of theoretical prejudice.
This paper has analyzed typicality assumptions using
the Bayesian framework. The main conclusions have al-
ready been given in the Introduction and we will not
repeat them here. At present, there are no observational
data supporting an assumption that we are typical in
some class of observers, and our understanding of biolog-
ical evolution is insufficient to supply a theoretical justi-
fication through the likelihoods. Many calculations that
produce likelihoods that favor our typicality do so via the
selection fallacy; this can lead to absurd conclusions, as
the human/jovian model shows.
On the other hand, a preference for typicality can le-
gitimately be made through a suitable choice of priors.
However, such choices should be made explicit, so that
others can properly evaluate the conclusions that are ul-
timately reached.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Don Page for voluminous and clari-
fying communications, and to Tom Banks, Andre Linde,
Leonard Susskind, Alex Vilenkin, and colleagues in Santa
Barbara for useful remarks and helpful criticism. This
work was supported by the National Science Foundation
under grants PHY04-56556 and PHY05-55669.
[1] D. N. Page, “Is our universe likely to decay within 20
billion years?”, arXiv:hep-th/0610079.
[2] D. N. Page, “Susskind’s challenge to the Hartle-Hawking
no-boundary proposal and possible resolutions”, arXiv:
hep-th/0610199.
[3] D. N. Page, “Return of the Boltzmann brains”, arXiv:
hep-th/0611158.
[4] D. N. Page, “Is our universe decaying at an astronomical
rate?”, arXiv:hep-th/0612137.
[5] L. Dyson, M. Kleban, and L. Susskind, “Disturbing im-
plications of a cosmological constant”, JHEP 0210, 011
(2002) [arXiv:hep-th/0208013].
[6] R. Bousso and B. Freivogel, “A Paradox in the global
description of the multiverse”, arXiv:hep-th/0610132.
[7] A. Linde, “Sinks in the landscape and the invasion of
Boltzmann brains”, arXiv:hep-th/0611043.
[8] A. Vilenkin, “Freak observers and the measure of the
multiverse”, arXiv:hep-th/0611271.
[9] T. Banks, “Entropy and initial conditions in cosmology”,
arXiv:hep-th/0701146.
[10] J. Garcia-Bellido, A. D. Linde and D. A. Linde, “Fluc-
tuations of the gravitational constant in the inflationary
Brans-Dicke cosmology”, Phys. Rev. D 50, 730 (1994)
[arXiv:astro-ph/9312039].
[11] A. Vilenkin, “Predictions from quantum cosmology”,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 846 (1995) [arXiv:gr-qc/9507018].
[12] L. Smolin, “Scientific alternatives to the anthropic princi-
ple”, in Universe or Multiverse?, edited by B. Carr (Cam-
bridge 2007) [arXiv:hep-th/0407213].
[13] R. M. Neal, “Puzzles of anthropic reasoning re-
solved by using full non-indexical conditioning”,
arXiv:math.ST/ 0608592.
[14] M. Srednicki, “Subjective and objective probabilities in
quantum mechanics”, Phys. Rev. A 71, 052107 (2005)
[arXiv:quant-ph/0501009].
[15] E. T. Jaynes, Probability Theory: the Logic of Science
(Cambridge 2003).
[16] D. M. Appleby, “Probabilities are single-case, or noth-
ing”, Optics and Spectroscopy 99, 447 (2005) [arXiv:
quant-ph/0408058].
[17] C. Huygens, Cosmotheoros (Adriaan Moetjens, The
Hague, 1698) [Eng. trans. from the Latin, The Celes-
tial Worlds Discovered: or, Conjectures on the Inhab-
itants, Plants, and Productions of the World in the
Planets (Timothy Childe at the White Hart at the
west end of St. Paul’s Churchyard, London, 1698), also
7www.phys.uu.nl/∼huygens.]
[18] D. N. Page, “Sensible quantum mechanics: are proba-
bilities only in the mind?”, Int. J. Mod. Phys. D5, 583
(1996) [arXiv:gr-qc/9507024].
[19] M. Srednicki, “Chaos and quantum thermalization”,
Phys. Rev. E 50, 888 (1994) [arXiv:cond-mat/9406056];
“The approach to thermal equilibrium in quan-
tized chaotic systems”, J. Phys. A 32 1163 (1999)
[arXiv:cond-mat/9809360].
[20] J. B. Hartle, “Anthropic reasoning and quantum cosmol-
ogy”, in The New Cosmology, edited by R. Allen, D.
Nanopoulos and C. Pope, AIP Conference Proceedings,
v. 743 (AIP, Melville, NY, 2004) [arXiv:gr-qc/0406104].
